



## SHIPPING INTELLIGENCE.

### ARRIVALS.

From the Bay of Island, yesterday, having left the 14th ultimo, the schooner *Thomas*, 17 tons, Captain Beard, with 11 tons cargo—Mr. Armstrong.

The Captain of the vessel, having left the 14th ultimo, the schooner *Lady Leigh*, 109 tons, Captain Muir, with 15 tons black oil, Passengers—Captain G. Smith, Messrs. Dugdale, Mr. Ferguson, and Shand.

On the 1st inst., the same day, the steamer *Wainright*, 103 tons, Captain Parsons, with timber, &c., Passengers—Capt. Pittman, Mr. McNaughton, Mr. Brown, Mr. and Mrs. Gooder, and family, Mr. Yarrow, Mr. Gibbs, and two in the steerage.

### DEPARTURES.

The *Tamar*, whaler, was still at the Bay of Islands when the *Thomas* left. The American ship *Grosset* left, from Port Maitland, the 12th ultimo. The *Maitland* touched at Port Stephens on the passage up; the former Clarence, belonging to Sydney, was lying there.

### COASTERS INWARDS.

August 31.—*Northumberland*, 17, Dennis, from Port Aiken, with shells; *Sovereign*, 119 tons, Captain from Melbourne, with 60 tons coal, hay, &c., 60 bags sand; *Wainright*, 103 tons, Captain Parsons, from Port Macquarie, with 2000 feet hard wood, 100 bushels maize, 22 hives; *Julia*, 12, Frater, from Shoalhaven, with 300 bushels corn, 100 bushels maize, 100 feet cedar, 2 barrels wool; *Patriot*, 40, Burrowes, from the Clarence, with 18,000 feet cedar.

### COASTERS OUTWARDS.

August 31.—*Fly*, 10, League, for Brisbane Water, in ballast; *Maitland*, steamer, 102, for Port Macquarie, with sundries; *Sovereign*, 119 tons, Captain Parsons, from Port Macquarie, with 2000 feet hard wood, 100 bushels maize, 22 hives; *Julia*, 12, Frater, from Shoalhaven, with 300 bushels corn, 100 bushels maize, 100 feet cedar, 2 barrels wool; *Patriot*, 40, Burrowes, from the Clarence, with 18,000 feet cedar.

condition of slaves. They hold their posessions by the smallest of all tenures—the *ipsa dicit* of an irresponsible feoffor. As graziers, they live, move, and have their being, in the pleasure of that dread man. His breath can mar them, as his breath hath made. With one stroke of his talismanic pen, he can blase their prospects, wither their hopes, and scatter their property to the winds. The ground under their feet claims as *his own*. Every tree beneath which they spread their tents, or of which they build their huts—every blade of grass, every drop of water, that gives sustenance to their flocks and herds—is *his*. Hills and dales—forests and plains—rivers, streams, lakes, ponds—all are *Ais*. The title with which he is pleased to invest the occupants, is the slenderest known either to law or usage. It is not a grant—not a lease—but simply a *license*; a license of mere occupation; a license for a single year; a license which he may refuse to renew; a license which he can at any moment cancel.

Is this a state of things that ought to continue? Sir GEORGE GIBBS, last

Tuesday week, “if there was any one thing more important to the future interests of this colony than another, it was the administration of the domain of the Crown.” Granted—and sure we are that this domain can never be well administered by the dictum of one man. Its “inconvenient strength” is more than a match for the keenest intellect that ever statesman owned, for the bashest energies that even statesmen wield.

But while we admit the physical impossibility of the GOVERNOR doing justice to this stupendous interest, with no better auxiliaries than he now employs, we earnestly maintain that his powers over the licensed graziers are unconstitutional, and full of danger. To say nothing of the treachery of the human heart, which renders it at all times perilous to give one man too much power over another, we object that the want of ubiquity, and the fallibility of the human judgment, are alone sufficient to brand the present system with carelessness and condonation. The GOVERNOR monopolises in his own person, with reference to these twenty thousand graziers, both the judicial and the executive functions. He is judge, jury, and executioner. Sitting alone at his desk, he can arraign, try, convict, sentence, and punish absconce parties, who are helpless in his official grasp as a babe in the clutch of HERCULES.

This is wrong—radically and glaringly wrong—and must be amended.

### NEW ZEALAND.

PAPERS from Auckland to the 25th July, Wellington to the 9th August, and Nelson to the 16th July, came to hand yesterday. They contain nothing of particular importance, but we shall endeavour to find a few interesting extracts for to-morrow’s paper.

### LAWS INTELLIGENCE.

#### SUPREME COURT—CIVIL SIDE.

##### WEDNESDAY.

Before their Honors the Three Judges.

The Court estimated that it was ready to proceed in this case if the counsel were sufficiently prepared.

The ATTORNEY-GENERAL said, that before addressing the Court he wished that certain affidavits of Mr. Carrington, and others, might be read in order to show that Mr. Carrington had done every thing in his power to meet the order of the Judge at Port Phillip.

The CROWN JUSTICE said, that the Court could admit no new matter, if the affidavits of the Attorney-General adressed to the Court of the Lord High Chancellor—the patronage of the Queen’s Cabinet—the patronage of Her Most Gracious MAJESTY herself—were not to be named in the same moment with the patronage of Sir GEORGE GIBBS! Does he wish to serve a favourite flockmaster? He can give him, not indeed an appointment, but far better, a licensed range of territory, with which the nobles of country, in England, is a mere grass-plot. Does he wish to crush a recusant grazier, a political opponent? He can reject his application for a license, or, having granted it, he can refuse to renew it, or cancel it in the midst of its term; and thus inflict a deeper and more irreparable injury than any dismissal from salaried office.

Par be it from us to insinuate that such things have been done. We only say that such is the GOVERNOR’s power; that he holds in his hands an instrument whereby he can confer the most substantial boons upon his favourites, and inflict the most overwhelming calamities upon his enemies; and that this power takes within its giant grasp so vast an extent of territory, so prodigious an amount of accumulating property, and so large and increasing a number of free British subjects, that it is no longer safe that it should be lodged in one man’s hands.

His Excellency himself has acknowledged that “he had long felt that the squatting interest was growing to an inconvenient strength, and that it was getting too powerful.” In calling the interest alluded to the “squatting” interest, he used a wrong term. A squatter is a person who sits down, upon land not his own, without lease or license; but the transalpine graziers of New South Wales take possession under a written authority from the Crown, which assigns a definite tract of country for their exclusive use, and for which authority they pay a money consideration. They are not squatters, therefore, but *licessaries*. The right of occupancy, such as it is, is theirs by stipulation, by purchase, and by public recognition. This interest—the interest of licensed graziers—is acknowledged by the GOVERNOR to be “growing to an inconvenient strength,” to be “getting too powerful.” This is the very fact we have been endeavouring to prove, but with intentions very different from those of His Excellency. Because the interest is getting too powerful for his single management, he would curb and reduce it. We, on the contrary, contend that because he finds it “growing to an inconvenient strength,” he ought to give up the futile attempt to manage it single-handed. The Bathurst petitioners, and Mr. JAMES MACARTHUR, suggested the only course

Louisiana, on the 28th April, this order was reiterates, and Mr. Carrington was ordered to produce all papers, vouchers, and accounts, relating to the attachment of the horse to the court, and the attachment of the horse to the court, on the 28th April, at an examination into the cause of attachment, Mr. Carrington consented, by his counsel, Mr. Barry, to do. On the 25th of April, however, Mr. Carrington not producing these papers, vouchers, and accounts, the court, on the 28th April, ordered that he should appear, and bring up the cause of attachment, and that the attachment made by Mr. Justice Willis, to strike Mr. Carrington off the rolls of the Supreme Court; fifth, a rule nisi granted, on an application made by Mr. Carrington, to have a quantity of evidence taken, which was taken on the 28th April, in the insolvency of P. Snodgrass, previous to the order for striking N. S. Carrington off the rolls being given. Mr. Carrington, on the 28th April, called upon Mr. Justice Willis, dated 18th April, calling upon Mr. Carrington to produce an account of his transaction with the horse, and to call upon Mr. Carrington to produce all papers, vouchers, and accounts, connected with these transactions, on the 28th April; third, the order for attachment to last against Mr. Carrington, if he did not produce any evidence, and examinations in the affairs of the insolvent were gone on with. An affidavit by Mr. Carrington, in which he denied the attachment, was read, and the court, on the 28th April, after an examination on the 28th April, having been called on for certain documents, and ordered to do so by the trustee to the insolvent Snodgrass; and that affidavit filed by Mr. Carrington was sufficient to purge him from contempt; and that the attachment, Mr. Carrington into custody; and that the insolvent Act Mr. Carrington could not be called upon to produce “accounts” in default, the learned counsel said, the case was invalid; that the judge had no power to call upon Mr. Carrington to produce his papers and accounts, to do so by the trustee to the insolvent Snodgrass; that the affidavit filed by Mr. Carrington was sufficient to purge him from contempt; and that the attachment, Mr. Carrington into custody; and that the insolvent Act Mr. Carrington could not be called upon to produce “accounts” in default, the learned counsel said, the case was valid; that the judge had no power to call upon Mr. Carrington to produce his papers and accounts, to do so by the trustee to the insolvent Snodgrass; 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